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ABSTRACT
The importance of international health law, particularly the International 
Health Regulations (IHR 2005) adopted under the auspices of the World 
Health Organisation, has been widely acknowledged by scholars and policy 
makers. Given its importance in global governance of infectious diseases and 
global health security, aspects of the IHR feature prominently in the literature 
on global health governance, law and diplomacy. Apparently, case studies 
dealing with its impact on specific countries remain under researched. Against 
this background, this article examines the impact of IHR 2005 on domestic 
health governance mechanisms of infectious diseases in Nigeria. This article 
argues that Nigeria has made remarkable progress in terms of governance of 
infectious diseases manifested in legal responses, institutional arrangements 
and policy initiatives. It concludes that what is needed at this point is for 
Nigeria to improve on, and sustain these health governance mechanisms, 
which were instrumental in the successful containment of the Ebola Virus 
Disease outbreak in 2014.
Keywords: International Health Regulations, World Health Organisation, 
Governance, Infectious Disease, Health, Nigeria
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between domestic actions and implementation of international 
health law has been widely analysed by scholars. Yet, case studies documenting 
the role of domestic health governance mechanisms of infectious diseases 
in the application of the World Health Organisation (WHO) International 
Health Regulations (IHR 2005) remain limited. The use of international law 
in tackling contagious diseases is not novel. It dates back to 1851 when the 
first International Sanitary Conference was convened. Although only four 
conventions were eventually ratified after a series of eleven international 
conferences held between 1851 and 1903, the diplomatic efforts demonstrated 
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the need to confront the trans-border spread of disease multilaterally through 
international conventions (Aginam, 2000).
 The International Sanitary Regulations was adopted by WHO in 1951. 
It was a creation of the nineteenth century International Sanitary Conferences. 
The adoption was a glaring manifestation of the legacy bequeathed to WHO, 
which came into existence in 1948, by the International Sanitary Conferences. 
It was renamed International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969 and amended 
in 1973 and 1981. The IHR was revised in 2005 to respond to the shortcomings 
of the International Sanitary Regulations in relation the constricted confines 
of the notifiable diseases (cholera, plague and yellow fever) in view of the 
emergence of new disease threats. Another major flaw was the reliance of 
previous regulations on voluntary official notification by countries, and the 
absence of formal internationally coordinated mechanisms to forestall the 
spread of diseases across borders. Moreover, there was nothing in the existing 
regulations stipulating how the WHO and the affected countries were to 
collaborate in the containment of disease. The revised IHR finally entered 
into force in June 2007 as a legally binding set of Regulations for all WHO 
member states. The aim and scope of the IHR 2005 are: “to prevent, protect 
against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread 
of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public risks 
and which avoid unnecessary interference with international trade and traffic” 
(WHO, 2008).
 
 The WHO has a particular duty to ensure the right to health is 
realised through measures within the health field. This responsibility derives 
naturally from the WHO’s Constitution, which views health as a positive goal 
not only the absence of disease (WHO, 1948). Thus, the attainment of health 
requires that people’s right to health is realised. Article 12 of the International 
Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) confirms the 
right to health as “the highest attainable standard of social and mental health” 
(UN, 1966). The second part of the Article urged state parties to the Covenant 
to take appropriate actions for the realisation of right to health. It  requested 
state parties; “to adopt and implement a national public health strategy and 
plan of action on the basis of epidemiological evidence addressing the health 
concerns of the whole population” (UN, 1966). In this way, the IHR 2005 is 
in line with the ICESCR as it also requires countries to have their facilities 
to cope with the problems arising from the outbreak of infectious diseases 
and to make the facilities and measures available to their people and those 
of other countries. The IHR 2005 reaffirms the responsibilities of the state to 
protect the peoples’ right to health. The failure to fulfil the IHR obligations, 
theoretically, could be considered a breach of obligations to protect the human 
right to health. 
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 Importantly, the IHR 2005 gave a time frame for the implementation 
of the Regulations. Article 5:1 of the IHR provides: 
Each party shall develop, strengthen and 
maintain, as soon as possible but not later 
than five years from the entry into force 
of these Regulations for that State Party, 
the capacity to detect, assess, notify and 
report events in accordance with these 
Regulations (WHO, 2008)
 Article 13 further obliges state parties to: 
Develop, strengthen and maintain 
the capacity to respond promptly and 
effectively to public health risks and 
emergencies of international concern as 
soon as possible but no later than five 
years from the entry into force of the 
Regulations (WHO, 2008)
Unfortunately, most African countries could not achieve the targets within the 
specified time frame. According to the 2014 WHO Capacities Implementation 
Status, juxtaposed with other regions of the world, Africa has made little 
progress, in view of the recent progress in the implementation of IHR 2005 
(WHO, 2014). Against this background, this paper illustrates the impact of 
international law on contagious diseases control in developing countries, 
and contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of domestic health 
governance mechanisms of infectious disease in Nigeria. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
The adoption of IHR 2005 represent a major change in the global disease 
outbreak surveillance  and control regime since the beginning of international 
health diplomacy in 1851. It also introduced several significant changes to 
the behaviour expected of states. Article 21 of the Constitution of the World 
Health Organisation  empowered the World Health Assembly to adopt 
Regulations in several fields, such as: “a) sanitary and quarantine requirements 
and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease; 
b) nomenclature with respect to diseases causes of death and public health 
policies; c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international 
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use; d) standards with respect to the safety of parity and potency of biological 
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce; e) 
advertising and labelling of biological pharmaceutical and similar products 
moving in international commerce” (WHO, 1948). Article 22 further stipulates 
that: “Regulations adopted pursuant of shall come into force for all members 
after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly 
except for such members as may notify the Director General of rejection or 
reservations within the period stated in the notice” (WHO, 1948).
 To be sure, only two regulations had been adopted by the Assembly 
under Article 21 (a) and (b) since the establishment of the WHO. The First 
World Health Assembly adopted WHO Regulation No.1 regarding the 
unification of the statistical classification of morbidity and mortality primarily 
for comparability in 1948 (WHA, 1948). The Regulations were revised several 
times. The historical importance is twofold. First, they provided a guide to 
member states in compiling mortality and morbidity statistics by cause, age 
and sex and for various areas of the national territory. Second, the IHR 2005 
introduced a novel scenario in international law, where a state can be bound by 
a regulation without signature ratification of a formal treaty.
 
 The second WHO Regulation was adopted by the Fourth World 
Health Assembly in 1951 (WHA, 1951). They were replaced in 1969 by the 
International Health Regulations (WHA, 1969), which was ratified in 1971. 
The International Health Regulations represented a revised version of the 
previous International Sanitary Conventions including the 1903, 1912 and 
1926 International Sanitary Conventions. The significance of the International 
Health Regulations lies in the fact that it guarantees maximum security against 
the international spread of diseases with a minimal obstruction to international 
travel and trade. They contain rules on notification and epidemiological 
information, national health organisations, imports, airports, health measures 
on transport, cargo, goods, baggage and mail as well as specific rules on 
issuance health documents and imposition of charges on health measures. In 
1973, the World Health Assembly amended the Regulations, particularly to 
cut down the number diseases contained in the previous regulations from six 
to three namely, yellow fever, plague and cholera (WHA, 1973). Moreover, 
the need to remove smallpox from the list, in view of its global eradication, 
informed a further amendment of the Regulations in 1981 by the 34th World 
Health Assembly. (WHA, 1981)
 
 The quest for a revision of IHR can be traced to changes brought 
about by globalisation in the early 1990s. Globalisation had resulted in 
increasing frequency and rapidity of international trade and travel as well as 
other processes such as increased migration and urbanisation. The consequence 
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of this development was a pervasive feeling that pathogens could no longer 
be contained within state borders and that a new approach for responding 
to disease outbreak was required. Besides, the period also witnessed the 
emergence and re-emergence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS tuberculosis, 
Ebola among others, that pose trans-border health threats.  Against the 
backdrop of increasing international disease threat and need to ensure global 
health security, the Forty- eight World Health Assembly requested the Director 
General in 1995 to revise the International Health Regulation. Consequently, 
an informal consultation was held in December 1995, which brought together 
relevant staff from the WHO with experts and governments officials drawn 
from a range of member states. The group recommended that the existing 
principle of maximum security against the international spread of diseases 
involving minimum interference with travel and trade should underpin the 
revised IHR.  The group also identified a major gap basically the absence of 
any principle that would regulate procedures necessary for the management of 
new and remerging diseases, especially those that constitutes an international 
threat. The International Health Regulations cannot refer specifically to 
diseases that were not known at the time they were last revised. This was the 
case with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The group also 
recommended that the regulations be revised and expanded. The 52nd World 
Health Assembly in 1999 considered a report by the WHO Secretariat on 
the progress of the revision and updating process of the International Health 
Regulations (WHO, 1999).
 The International Health Regulations (IHR) was finally revised in 
2005. It automatically replaces the provisions of the following international 
sanitary agreements and regulations:  “a) International Sanitary Convention 
signed in Paris, 21 June 1926; b) International Sanitary Convention of Aerial 
Navigation Signed at The Hague 12 April 1933; c) International Agreement 
for dispensing with Bill of Health Signed in Paris 22 December 1934; d) 
International Agreement for dispensing with consular visas on Bills of Health 
singed in Paris 22 December 1934; e) Convention modifying the International 
Sanitary Convention of 21 June 1926, signed in Paris 31 October 1938; f) 
International Sanitary Convention 1944 modifying the International Sanitary 
Convention of 21 June 1926, opened or signature in Washington, 15 December 
1944; g) International Sanitary Convention of 12 April, 1933, opened for 
signature in Washington 15 December 1944; h) Protocol of 23 April 1946 to 
prolong the International Sanitary Convention, 1944 signed in Washington; i) 
Protocol of 23 April to prolong the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial 
Navigation 1944 signed in Washington; j) International sanitary regulations, 
1951, and the Additional Regulations of 1955, 1956, 1960, 1963 and 1965; 
and k)The International Health Regulations of 1969 and the amendments of 
1973 and 1981” (WHO, 2005). 
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Furthermore, IHR 2005 consist of several innovations, which include: “a)  a 
scope not limited to any disease or manner of transmission …; b) state parties 
obligations to develop certain minimum core public health capacities; c) 
obligations on state parties to notify WHO of events that may constitute a 
public health emergency of international concern according to defined criteria; 
d) provisions authorising WHO to take into consideration unofficial reports 
of public health events and ask states to obtain verification from state parties 
concerning such events; e) procedures for the determination by the Director 
General of a public health emergency of international concern and  issuance 
of corresponding temporary recommendations after taking into accounts the 
views of Emergency Committee; f) protection of the human rights of persons 
and travellers; and g) the establishment of National IHR Focal Points and 
WHO IHR Contact Points for urgent communications between state parties 
and WHO” (WHO, 2008).
 By and large, the IHR 2005 created a governance system that brings 
together state and non-state actors in the fight against infectious disease. More 
importantly, the revised Regulations represent a shift from a list of specified 
diseases to ‘syndromic reporting’ in which states are required to report outbreak 
of various syndromes of urgent public health importance (WHO, 2005). 
David Fidler captured this very clearly when he wrote that: “this innovative 
approach – which provides for an ‘open category’ encompassing any disease 
that may seriously and generally put public health at risk – represents the real 
revolutionary element characterising the IHR 2005, since they allow a more 
flexible application with a better management of new health hazards” (Fidler, 
2004).
WHO INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS AND 
DOMESTIC HEALTH GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS OF 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN NIGERIA
As earlier stated, the IHR 2005 comprises a number of new or expanded 
normative commitments including core capacity infrastructure, transparent 
and timely reporting of a wider range of diseases, and putting in place 
proportionate responses to outbreaks. Specifically, Nigeria had been a party 
to all the previous Regulations even before its full membership of the World 
Health Organisation in 1960. These are manifested in several public health 
laws, policies and institutional arrangements.
LEGAL MECHANISMS
Article 3, paragraph 4 of the revised IHR emphasises the sovereign right 
of State to legislate in pursuance of their health policies but the discretion 
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must be exercised within the boundary of the IHR 2005. Two sources of legal 
mechanisms authorise the Federal government to adopt precautionary and 
subdual actions based on either speculation about or during emergencies. One 
source of authority is the Nigerian Constitution. The Constitution permits the 
President to announce a public health emergency as well as restrict certain 
individual rights, including the right to personal liberty and property. The 
President is also authorised by law to declare a state of emergency either 
unilaterally or at the behest of a state governor in the event of any of the 
following: “ … c) there is critical breakdown of public order and  public safety 
in the federation or any part thereof as to require extraordinary measures to 
restore peace and security; d)there is clear and present danger of an actual 
breakdown of public order and public safety in the federation or any part 
thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert such  danger; e) there is 
occurrence or imminent danger, or the occurrence of any disaster or natural 
calamity, affecting the community or a section of the community in the 
federation; f) there is any other public danger which clearly constitutes a threat 
to the existence of the federation (Nigeria, 1999).
 In 2014, the then Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan exercised 
his authority, as enshrined in the Constitution. He announced a national 
emergency following the outbreak of the Ebola disease in the country (Ebola, 
2014). He also directed all relevant government agencies both at the federal 
and state levels to work in tandem towards the containment of the disease. A 
Special Intervention Plan and a Special Intervention Fund of NGN1.9 billion 
were also released to combat the virus (Ebola, 2014). 
 Another legal mechanism is the statutory (legal) regime. The 1926 
Quarantine Act (revised in 2004) remains the only extant law governing 
matters related to public health crisis in the country (Nigeria, 2014). The Act 
provides for and regulates the imposition of quarantine, as well as prevention 
of the spread of infectious disease in Nigeria, and the transmission of the 
country Nigeria in accordance with the international Health Regulations. The 
Act regulates:
the imposition of quarantine and to 
make other provisions for preventing the 
introduction into and spread in Nigeria, 
and the transmission from Nigeria, of 
dangerous infectious diseases (Nigeria, 
2014). 
The Quarantine Act requires the President to declare any contagious disease 
as a deadly infectious disease. This authority was used in the past to categorise 
sleeping sickness as a harmful infection. Likewise, the President is empowered 
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by the Act to declare any location within or outside the country an infected 
local area. The Nigerian Public Health Bill is currently being considered at 
the Nigerian legislative chambers. The Bill is intended to replace the extant 
Quarantine Act (Senate, 2015).
INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS
A major requirement of the IHR 2005 is the building of core capacities at the 
various points of entry – airports, ports and land borders. This is imperative to 
facilitate timely response to events of public health emergency of international 
concern. It further stipulates the role of competent authorities at the various 
designated points of entry. To manage this effort, the Port Health Services, was 
established as a unit in the Public Health Department of the Federal Ministry of 
Health. It is noteworthy that the Port Health Services was established in 1925 in 
response to the plague epidemic (Ademuson, 2015). The Port Health Services 
is saddled with the responsibility of implementing the IHR at the designated 
points of entry. There are five designated international airports, where such 
services existed, namely Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos, 
Port Harcourt International Airport, Margaret Ekpo International Airport, 
Calabar, Aminu Kano International Airport, Kano and Nnamdi Azikwe 
International Airport, Abuja. The five designated seaports are Apapa, Tincan 
Island, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Calabar Ports. There are land borders in 22 
of the 36 states of the country.
 The Port Health Services helps to ensure adequate disease 
surveillance the various Points of Entry. Other functions of the PHS include 
immunisation and issuance of international health certificate, boarding and 
inspection of ships, provision of curative and preventive health care services 
such as, referral and laboratory services in accordance with the provisions of 
the IHR 2005. In addition, they handle the health screening of pilgrims for 
hajj, refugees and deportees. However, the implementation of IHR by the Port 
Health Services has been bedevilled by several factors including the lack of 
health services at the screening posts and baggage checking at the airports, 
insufficient quarantine facilities and lack of cooperation between the Port 
Health Services and other agencies involved in the implementation of the IHR. 
Nevertheless, the Ebola crisis has been described as a blessing in disguise for 
ports health services. The Port Health Services came out of the Ebola crisis 
stronger in terms of increased staff strength, equipment, funding and political 
support.
 The Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) is another 
institution established in response to the requirement of the IHR. The NCDC 
was established primarily to identify, assess and communicate current 
and emerging threats to human health posed by infectious disease. NCDC 
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partner with other national health agencies in Africa in the discharge of its 
responsibilities of developing and strengthening disease surveillance and early 
warning systems. The agency also involved in providing scientific information 
and training. 
POLICY INITIATIVES
Another way in which WHO Regulations has influenced public policy in 
Nigeria is in the area of integrated disease surveillance and response. Article 5.1 
of the IHR 2005 requires State Parties adopt or strengthen their infrastructure 
for public health surveillance and responses (WHO, 2008). Nigeria introduced 
the disease surveillance system in 1988. The establishment was informed by 
the outbreak of yellow fever in 1986/87, which affected 10 out of the then 19 
existing states of the Federation. The extent of the outbreak was ascribed to 
weak or rather absence disease surveillance and notification mechanisms in 
most states (FMOH, 2005). Sequel to this, the Federal Ministry of Health set 
up a committee to review the disease surveillance and notification mechanisms 
in the country. A Disease Surveillance and Notification System (DSNS) was 
subsequently developed in 1988/89. The DSNS identified and designated 40 
diseases of public health importance that require routine monthly notification. 
The DSNS also selected 10 epidemic prone diseases out of the 40 for 
immediate reporting.   Apart from disease identification, the DSN introduced 
standard reporting forms namely DSN 001 for immediate reporting and DSN 
002 for monthly reporting (FMOH, 2005). Another important milestone was 
the introduction of methodology that will guide information flow between the 
various levels. The National Council on Health gave its consent to the adoption 
of Disease surveillance and Notification (DSN) in the country in 1989.
 Although significant strides were made in the implementation 
of the disease surveillance system in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it did 
not produce the expected outcome - the information required for immediate 
response. This is attributable to the vertical surveillance systems adopted by 
some disease control programmes. Besides, the involvement of laboratories 
was unsatisfactory. This disappointing situation was not peculiar to Nigeria, 
other countries in the WHO African Region faced similar challenge. As a 
corollary, the World Health Organisation Regional Committee for Africa in 
her 48th Session in September 1988 in Harare, Zimbabwe pushed for a total 
revision of the existing surveillance system by member states. The Committee 
further promoted the adoption of an integrated disease surveillance system by 
countries in the region. The IDSR that emerged from this development was 
endorsed by countries in the WHO African region including Nigeria.
 As part of the initial step in the implementation process of the IDSR 
in Nigeria, an orientation workshop was organised in June 2000 primarily to 
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sensitize the major stakeholders. Furthermore, a steering Committee was set 
up in January 2001 to midwife the implementation process. The Committee 
undertook a thorough assessment of the existing surveillance system. It 
found that one of the shortcomings of the previous system was the use of 
vertical surveillance by certain disease programmes. Other flaws include 
proliferation of reporting forms and format which resulted in incomplete and 
untimely reporting;  dearth of pre-positioned medicines and vaccines; lack 
of communication tools; absence of case management protocols, insufficient 
laboratory equipment; high rate of communicable diseases e.g. malaria, 
diarrhoea, pneumonia, measles, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDs; and poor funding 
(FMOH, 2005). The committee came up with three major recommendations. 
First, it suggested the establishment of a national standard case definitions 
and management protocols for priority diseases. Second, it proposed requisite 
training for IDSR and thirdly the provision of budget line for IDSR (FMOH, 
2005). As a consequence, the National Policy on Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response was formulated in 2005. The Policy provided a comprehensive 
national guideline for IDSR with details of sectoral responsibilities. It also 
defined the roles for the tiers of the Nigeria’s health system as well as the 
private sector.
 It is axiomatic that the current IDSR strategy in Nigeria represents 
a clear departure from the previous cumbersome and ineffective vertical 
disease surveillance system. Its relevance lies in its excellent coordination 
mechanism. The primary focus in the IDSR system is the local government 
area in Nigeria (FMOH, 2009), The IDSR also consists of a list of prudently 
selected 40 communicable and non-communicable diseases and public health 
events, which were grouped into three classifications: epidemic prone diseases, 
diseases targeted for eradication and elimination and other diseases of public 
health importance. However, the Federal Ministry of Health, however, pointed 
out that the IDSR notifiable diseases, conditions and public health event are 
subject to modification..
Table 1
List of Nigeria Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) 
Notifiable Diseases, Conditions and Pubic Health Events
Categories of Notifiable Diseases Notifiable Diseases
Epidemic Prone Diseases Cholera, Diarrhoea with blood, Measles, Meningitis, 
Viral haemorrhagic fevers (Lassa, Ebola Virus Disease, 
Human Influenza caused by a new subtype, yellow fever, 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Smallpox, 




Categories of Notifiable Diseases Notifiable Diseases
Disease Targeted for eradication and 
elimination
 Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) / poliomyelitis, 
Dracunculiasis, Leprosy, Neonatal tetanus, Lymphatic 
filariasis, Tuberculosis
Other diseases of public health 
importance
 Diarrhoea in children less than five years of age, Human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) / Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), malaria, Onchocerciasis, 
Sexually transmitted infections (STIs), Trypanosomiasis, 
Buruliulcers, Asthma, Diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, High 
blood pressure, Sickle cell disease, Malnutrition, plague, 
Trachoma, typhoid, Hepatitis-B, Pertussis, Human 
Rabies, Schistosomiasis, Noma
Adapted from: National Policy on Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response, Federal 
Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria, 2005
A discussion on the pattern information flow of in the IDSR system in Nigeria 
is particularly germane at this point. One dominant pattern of information flow 
is reporting and feedback. The flow starts from the health facility - public 
and private, where diseases with epidemic potential as well as those marked 
for eradication and elimination are reported to focal persons. The focal 
person, using the designated reporting forms, forwards its report to the Local 
Government Area Disease Surveillance and Notification Officer (DSNO) 
using the designated IDSR reporting forms. The LGA DSNO collates data 
received from the health facility data from the health facilities, which is sent 
to the next level - the State Ministry of Health (SMoH) (FMOH, 2009).  The 
SMoH through its epidemiology unit collates data received from the LGAs and 
send it to the Epidemiology Division of the Federal Ministry of Health. The 
SMoH analyses and provides feedback to the health facilities and the public. 
Another duty undertaken at this point is the planning of appropriate operations 
and strategies for disease control (FMOH, 2009). At the FMOH, data is 
collated and forwarded to the statistics division - the National Management 
Information System (NHMIS).Three important actions are taken at the federal 
level namely analysis,  feedback and  planning for appropriate operations and 
strategies for disease control.
Figure 1
 Flow of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) Data in 
Nigeria
Health Facility Public or 
Private Collect data on standard IDRS format
LGA Health Department Receive form from HF. Collate and forward to SMoH Analyse and feedback to HF
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State Ministry of Health 
Epidemiology Unit
Collate data and forward to FMoH. Analyse and 
feedback to LGA
Federal Ministry of Health 
(Epidemiology Division)
Collate data and forward to NHMIS. Analyse and 
feedback to SMoH
WHO
 Key: Reporting  Feedback
Adapted from National Policy on Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response, 
Federal Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria, 2005
EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE OUTBREAK AND DOMESTIC HEALTH 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE: A 
REFLECTION
The Ebola Virus Disease outbreak provides a clear picture of the benefits 
as well as the practical difficulties of containing an infectious disease. The 
Ebola disease outbreak occurred in Lagos following the arrival of a Liberian 
diplomat, Patrick Sawyer, at the Lagos International Airport on 20 July, 
2014. The primary patient, who had contracted the virus in Liberia before 
his arrival in the country, was suspected to have potentially exposed seventy-
two individuals. Shortly after, another outbreak occurred on 1 August 2014, 
after the close contact to the primary patient, who was under quarantine in 
Lagos travelled to seek medical attention from a private physician. The WHO 
officially declared Nigeria Ebola free on 20 October 2014, barely four months 
after its outbreak. 
  
 The swift containment of Ebola Virus Disease in Nigeria with only a 
few casualties (19 individuals were infected with only 7 deaths recorded) has 
been described as a great success story. The outbreak played into the strengths 
of the domestic health governance mechanisms in the country. The outbreak has 
strongly demonstrated the underlying benefits of a functional national disease 
surveillance and notification system.  To be sure, early recognition and detection 
of infectious diseases contributes to timely intervention and reduces casualties. 
In dealing with the outbreak the Federal Ministry of Health in tandem with the 
Nigerian Centre for Disease Control mobilised other institutions and resources 
to fight the disease. As earlier stated Federal government approved a special 
intervention plan to contain and prevent the spread of Ebola outbreak and the 
sum of USD$11.5 million was released to support the implementation. The 
Nigerian Centre for Disease Control in collaboration with state governments, 
the WHO, UNICEF, Medicin Sans Frontieres and the US Centre for Disease 
Control  established the Incident Management Centre (Emergency Operations 
Centre (EOC)) at the Central Public Health Laboratory in Yaba, Lagos and 
Rivers States to respond to the outbreak (Ikhuoria, 2016). (See figure 2) The 
results were impressive. It led to the isolation of all individuals suspected of an 
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infection and those with confirmed cases of an infection were sent to facilities 
in Lagos and Port Harcourt.
 
 Nigeria executed a highly organised response to the Ebola outbreak, 
a feat accomplished through effective deployment of domestic governance 
mechanisms of infectious disease. For example, Ports Health Services through 
the IHR regulation mechanisms, embarked on early contact tracing (Shuaib, 
2016). It also cooperated with the airlines and other agencies to ensure 
notification of the outbreak.  The effective contact tracing process has been 
adjudged the major reason for the success story. The response also benefitted 
from existing use of public health institutions, such as the Nigerian Centre 
for Disease Control. The spread of public awareness through the media also 
contributed in part to the effectiveness of the fight against Ebola. The short 
messages directly addressed what people could do to protect themselves such 
as washing of hands frequently, not touching corpses, and reporting anyone to 
the health authorities if they showed symptoms.
 The WHO, for its part, summarizes the factors responsible for 
Nigeria’s performance in curbing the epidemic as follows: “rapid utilisation 
of public institutions and prompt establishment of EOC,  availability of a first 
rate virology laboratory to make quick and reliable diagnosis, availability of 
qualified contact tracers who were able to detect infections early and isolate 
suspected cases, full attention of the country’s leadership including that of the 
Head of State, general allocation of resources and quick disbursement and 
effective communication campaigns and experience accumulated fighting 
previous outbreaks, such as polio” (WHO, 2015). Besides, it has been argued 
that the response in Nigeria would not have been successful if not for the 
country’s experience in combating polio. In the process of combating the 
polio virus Nigeria developed public health institutions and strategies to fight 
infectious disease. This incidence demonstrates the importance of developing 
an efficient domestic health governance of infectious disease.
 To acknowledge the success of Ebola virus disease containment in 
Nigeria is not to suggest that there are no longer challenges. Nigeria is still 
faced with serious constraints in implementing the IHR.  Potential obstacles 
to functional disease surveillance and control system include insufficient 
funding, inadequate staffing and inappropriate or insufficient training of 
existing staff, corruption in the health sector. There is also the problem of 
dysfunctional health systems and weak communication infrastructure in the 
remote areas. Inadequate political will and commitment to public health has 
also posed serious threats. Clear manifestation is the neglect of health issues 
by the various tiers governments in the country.  
 
 Another challenge is the donor partner priorities that may be 
at variance with national priorities is also a serious constraint. The rigid 
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restrictive policies of donor agencies hinder the full utilisation of human and 
financial resources for integrating disease surveillance systems. To illustrate, 
financial resources allocated for activities under a particular donor-funded 
disease project like tuberculosis project, may not be applied for activities 
under an HIV/AIDS project even if the outcome of such an activity will have 
mutual benefit for both project. Similarly, the activities of individuals hired 
under a donor-funded project are strictly limited to the confines of the donor 
project. For example, a virologist employed under a donor-funded project 
dealing with measles may not be allowed to place his expertise at the service 
of his government during an epidemic of yellow fever. These obstacles 
notwithstanding, the domestic health governance mechanisms succeeded in 
reducing the number of casualties dramatically.
Figure 2
The Organisational Chart of the Nigeria Ebola Response Incident Management 
Centre, July-September 2014
Adapted from: Faisal Shuaib et al, ‘Ebola Virus Outbreak- Nigeria, July- September 
2014,’ Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Centre for Disease Control and 




So far, this paper has demonstrated the role of domestic health governance 
mechanisms in the implementation of international law, IHR 2005, under the 
auspices of the World Health Organisation. It has shown that Nigeria has made 
remarkable progress in terms of governance of infectious disease manifested 
in legal responses, institutional arrangements and policy initiatives. The 
efficacy of these governance mechanisms was put to test during the Ebola 
Virus Disease outbreak in 2014. Interestingly, the containment was a huge 
success in terms of the number of people that lost their lives. However, in 
order to ensure sustainability of these health governance mechanisms for 
infectious diseases, the government should focus more on disease prevention 
through capacity building. The point being made is that adequate resources 
should be made available for developing not only capacity to report, detect, 
and investigate suspected infectious disease outbreaks and prevent sporadic 
cases, especially of known disease, from escalating to epidemics, but also 
for requisite manpower training. In the final analysis, corruption in Nigeria’s 
health sector must be tackled to sustain the domestic health governance 
mechanisms of infectious diseases. This is imperative to ensure transparency 
and accountability in the disbursement of funds allocated for the prevention 
and control of infectious diseases in the country.
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